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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY TO REMOTE USERS OF
OBVIOUSLY DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES
A recent New York Supreme Court ruling' dismissed a complaint alleging
negligence on the part of a manufacturer of a storm door which resulted in
injury to an infant. The court found that "the instant complaint fails to allege
that the defective condition of the storm door was latent or that it created a
danger that was hidden from the infant plaintiff. Such omission renders the
pleading legally insufficient." ' 2 The federal courts have enunciated a similar
3
rule.
Liability of manufacturers or suppliers to ultimate and remote users of4
their products has been a source of controversy since Winterbottom v. Wright.
The English court in that case invoked the privity doctrine, and held that
the plaintiff, not being in privity with the defendant, could not maintain a
cause of action in negligence for an injury sustained as a result of a product
failure. After a series of New York decisions which gradually eroded the
force of the Winterbottom case, 5 Judge Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,6 discarded the doctrine of privity in actions involving inherently
dangerous instrumentalities or products which become dangerous if negligently
made. The MacPherson decision has been construed by the New York Court
of Appeals to limit liability of the manufacturer to instances where the defect
which causes the injury is hidden. 7 From this interpretation of the MacPherson rule has developed the strict pleading requirement first announced by
the court of appeals in 1957.8
1. Eilenberg v. 0 & M Storm Window Co., 17 Misc. 2d 799, 187 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup.
Ct. 1959). The complaint was dismissed pursuant to Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil
Practice.
2. Id. at 800, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
3. See, e.g., Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1013 (1959). Chief Judge Charles E. Clark wrote a vigorous dissent in which he renounced
the practice of applying a formal pleading rule to the facts before the court instead of
applying principles of negligence law in determining duty.
4. 4 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 409 (Ex. 1842). The action here was brought by a
person injured in a stagecoach which had been repaired by the defendant. There was no
contractual relationship between the parties.
5. See Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (defectively made coffee urn) ; Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956 (1908) (defective
aerated water bottle) ; Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) (imperfectly constructed
scaffold); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (mislabeled poison).
6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
See also
7. See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934),
where the court of appeals, in a dictum, first recognized the latent-patent distinction by
conditioning application of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 6, on the existence
of a hidden defect or latent danger.
8. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.
2d 699 (1957). For lower court cases following this decision see Eilenberg v. 0 & M Storm
Window Co., 17 Misc. 2d 799, 187 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Thomas v. Jerominek,
8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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The purpose of this comment is to examine the rationale of the decisions
which have established the requirement of a hidden danger or defect in the
manufacturer-liability cases.
THm MACPHERSON DocmRNE,

In MacPherson, Judge Cardozo found that the test of a manufacturer's
duty was not based on any contractual relationship between the parties but
rather on the foreseeable risk that would result if the manufacturer were
negligent. Concerning the manufacturer's duty the court said: "We have put
aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have
put its source in the law." 9 Several courts and text writers,10 however, treated
the MtacPlerson rule as an exception to the general rule of nonliability in
manufacturer-remote user cases. A recent decision indicates New York courts
are still in this company."'
Although in MacPherson the defect, a rotted spoke in a wooden wheel, was
in fact a hidden one, Judge Cardozo did not anywhere in his opinion condition
recovery upon that fact. The courts, nevertheless, have effectively restricted
MacPlterson to its facts; that is to say, if a remote user is to have a cause
of action he must be injured by a hidden defect.
THE CAPo RUrE
The leading manufacturer-remote user case requiring an allegation of a
hidden defect is Campo v. Scofield . 2 While feeding onions into a topping
machine, the plaintiff caught his hands in its exposed blades. The negligence
charged to the manufacturer was twofold: (1) a failure to employ safety
devices; and (2) a failure to provide a rapid means to turn off the machine
in an emergency. The court of appeals sustained the dismissal of the complaint
since the plaintiff failed to "allege and prove the existence of a latent defect
or a danger not known to the plaintiff or other users."' 3
The obviousness of the danger, therefore, relieved the defendant of liability

in the Campo case. It might well be argued that in such a case there should
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
10. See, e.g., 3 Cooley, Torts § 493, at 463 (4th ed. 1932), where it is stated that "the
general rule is that a contractor, manufacturer, vendor, or furnisher of an article is not
liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the
construction, manufacture or sale of such article." See also Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong
Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927); International Prod.
Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
11. A recent supreme court decision premised its discussion of a case with theze words:
"The plaintiff not in privity with the defendant manufacturer... sues in ... negligence. . . ." Thomas v. Jerominek, S Misc. 2d 517, 513, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (Sup. Ct.

1957). See also Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d S95,
164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
12. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).

13.

Id. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 803.
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be no recovery because the plaintiff was obviously either contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk. The Campo court, however, discussed neither
contributory negligence nor assumption of risk. It based its decision on the
lack of foreseeability. In effect, the court held that once the defect is obvious
no further duty is owed because it is not reasonably foreseeable that any
rational person in good physical condition could be injured if he used reason14
able care.
This objective view of foreseeability, which is not endorsed by the more
liberal scholars,'r is classically illustrated in Inman v. Binghamton Housing
Authority. 16 A two-year-old child, incapable of being contributorily negligent,1 7
fell from an unguarded terrace in an apartment house. The court dismissed the
complaint against the architect and builder since it lacked the allegation of a
hidden defect. Clearly the builder knew, when he built a terrace without a
railing, that a person using it would be exposed to injury. The court apparently
reasoned, however, that because the lack of a railing was apparent the builder
could not foresee injury since prudent men would have avoided the danger.
How much more objective a standard of foreseeability could be applied? The
two-year-old child was not reasonably prudent, nor would have been a blind
man, though both could reasonably be expected to be found in an apartment
house, along with idiots, epileptics and persons under other assorted disabilities.
Even a prudent man who had been swept away by a windstorm or who had
slipped on ice, both of which are foreseeable, and who might have been saved
by a guard rail, would have no cause of action because objectively no duty was
imposed on the builder to guard the terrace so long as the lack of a guard was
apparent. The lower courts in New York have followed this rule.' 8
Another test of foreseeability, one apparently applied in most tort actions
other than manufacturer-remote user situations, is that the defendant should
14. For a case strikingly similar in facts and result see Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249
N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959). See also Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d
23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151
Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940); Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d
853 (1948). Here the courts, while holding that the plaintiff was precluded from recovering for the injury because of the obviousness of the danger, seemed to view the question
of liability more from the point of view of the plaintiff's contributory negligence than
from the lack of duty on the part of the defendant. As we shall see, this fundamental
difference in approach could have a far-reaching effect. See Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev.
689, 692 (1958) (problem in such a test of foreseeability).
15. See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5 (1956); Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting
from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 629 (1952).
16. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
17. See Verni v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 436, 68 N.E.2d 431 (1946) (three-year-old child);
Day v. Johnson, 265 App. Div. 383, 39 N.Y.S.2d 203 (4th Dep't 1943) (four-year-old child,
question of capacity is for jury) ; Prosser, Torts § 31, at 129 (2d ed. 1955).
18. See, e.g., Eilenberg v. 0 & M Storm Window Co., 17 Misc. 2d 799, 187 N.Y.S.2d
922 (Sup. Ct. 1959). For a case decided prior to Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority,
3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957), see Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc.,
268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839
(1945).
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foresee that among a large group of people some will be careless and some
will be acting under disabilities.12 Here the ultimate question is whether, all
factors considered, the defendant could have taken reasonable steps to prevent
the injury in the first instance. Under this approach, any intervening factors
would not necessarily relieve the defendant of responsibility, though they
may bar the plaintiff's recovery. 0
In negligence cases not involving manufacturers and remote users, the
mere fact that a party is injured by an obvious danger or defect does not
automatically relieve the defendant of liability. Thus, it has been held in
New York that a person who falls on an icy sidewalk has a valid cause of
action, and possible contributory negligence is a question for the jury.2 ' In
another New York action,2 2 a visitor in the defendant's shop was injured by
chips flying from a lathe. Though the danger was obvious, the court did not
deny plaintiff a cause of action. Negligence was again a question for the jury.
In other jurisdictions the same test is applied. Thus, where injury resulted
from a fall into an obvious hole in a floor, - 3 coming into contact with exposed
electrical wires,2 4 a fall into an open elevator shaft or burns resulting from
ignition of an obviously highly inflammable robe, - G the courts held in each
case that the obviousness of the danger did not of itself preclude the plaintiff
from a cause of action, and the question of contributory negligence was one
for the jury.
It is one thing to say that because a particular plaintiff is aware of the
existence of an obvious defect he cannot recover against the defendant.
It is quite another matter to hold that in order for any plaintiff to recover he
must be injured by a hidden danger.
The first rule would take into account the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff and, possibly, assumption of risk. It would base lack of liability not
on the absence of a duty but rather on the intervening behavior of the plaintiff.
The majority of jurisdictions which considered the manufacturers' liability
problem, in most instances where the danger was obvious, found for the
defendant, but the cases were decided after a full trial of the issues.27 This
19. See Prosser, Torts § 49, at 269 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. Perry & James, Legal Cause, 60
Yale L.J. 761, 792 (1951).

20. Prosser, op. ci. supra note 19, at 268.
21. Matthiesen v. Adrian, 110 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 281 App. Div. 715,
118 N.Y.S.2d 560 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 694, 117 N.E.2d 639 (1954).
22. Klimaszewski v. Herrick, 263 App. Div. 235, 32 N.Y.S.2d 441 (4th Dep't 1942).
See also Pelligrino v. Seventh Chelsea Corp., 20 N.Y.S.2d 947 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940) (action
against contractor by employee of subcontractor for fall down stair well opening).
23. Eggen v. Hickman, 274 Ky. 550, 119 S.W.2d 633 (1938). See also Magay v. ClaflinSumner Coal Co., 257 Mass. 244, 153 N.E. 534 (1926) (coal hole in sidewalk).
24. Davidson v. Otter Tail Power Co., 150 Blinn. 446, 185 N.W. 644 (1921); Asher v.
City of Independence, 177 Mo. App. 1, 163 S.W. 574 (1914).
25. Landy v. Olson & Serley Co., 171 Blinn. 440, 214 N.V. 659 (1927).
26. Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d 217 (1945).
27. See, e.g, Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wichman, 220 F2d 426 (8th Cir. 1955);
Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940).
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is as it should be, because contributory negligence and assumption of risk are
usually questions of fact for a jury to determine.
Why is this more logical rule not applied in manufacturer-remote user cases
in New York? The answer is probably that the courts consider the manufacturer to require special protection where liability to remote users is concerned.28 Privity protection still survives in negligence cases. The fact that
the manufacturer has no personal relationship with the ultimate user and does
not know the propensities of each of thousands of ultimate users, imposes on
him only a minimum duty. Indeed, the Campo case has been styled a
carry-over of the privity doctrine,' 9 for while the court of appeals in both the
Campo and Inman cases avoided any open subscription to the privity doctrine,
it is clear that the court was greatly concerned with protection of the
manufacturer.3"
INCREASED LIABILITY WITHIN THE COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK

Some courts in refusing to impose a duty upon manufacturers to guard
remote users against obvious dangers, have commented upon the absence of
proof that protective devices, as a practical matter, could have been installed
by the manufacturer. 31 If an adequate showing were made that a machine
28. Nelson v. Win. H. Ziegler Co., 190 Minn. 313, 251 N.W. 534 (1933), in which a
recovery was permitted a user in privity with the manufacturer of an obviously dangerous
machine.
29. 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5, at 1544 (1956) ; Note, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 169 (1951);
Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 608 (1951). For support of the New York position see Note,
17 Brooklyn L. Rev. 349 (1951).
30. In Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 475, 95 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1950), Judge Fuld
said: "If, however, the manufacturer's liability is to be so extended, if so fundamental a
change is to be effected, we deem it the function of the legislature rather than of the courts
to achieve that change." The court in Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 33
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957), said: "There is in some sociological circles a
philosophy that the burden of damages suffered in accidents with manufactured articles
ought to be widely spread. . . .But such a plan ought to be adopted, if it is to be adopted,
by the voice of the people generally, expressed by the legislative branch. . . . It ought not
be imposed by the judicial branch." It would seem the federal court here was concerned
primarily with the fear of absolute liability.
The other "sociological circles" buttress their argument supporting extended liability on
the fact that a new relationship has grown up between manufacturer and ultimate user.
While these authorities themselves decry any attempt to create an absolute liability in the
manufacturer which would make him an insurer, they argue that the existing rule does
not conform to the law as it should be. See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5 (1956). This
authority, citing James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 769 (1950), points out that the best way of preventing industrial accidents is by
introducing safety devices on dangerous machinery. Further, it might well be argued that
because of mass advertising media used today which brings the manufacturers' product
directly before the eyes of the buying public, the rule that an absence of privity of contract
between parties prevents recovery by a remote user has become sterile.
31. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957). Cf. Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853
(1948). In Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, supra, the court said: "Appellant makes
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could reasonably be provided with safety guards, it is predictable that these
courts might find in the manufacturer a duty to install themY-' It is reasonable
to predict, however, that New York will be slow to increase manufacturers'
liability for any reason.
A possibility remains, nevertheless, that a skillful use of a pleading of
customary usage might overcome even the inflexibility of the Campo rule.33
It is reasonable enough to assume that if all manufacturers who produce
machines of the same type made by the defendant manufacturer use safety
guards, the defendant should reasonably be expected to see the purpose for
such use. It might also be argued that a manufacturer should foresee that
people who use particular types of machines which are customarily or almost
universally equipped with safety guards will naturally come to rely on the
presence of the guards in their operation of the machines. Failure of a small
group of manufacturers to comply with an industry policy with knowledge of
the general attitude of operators toward the machine or device might well
be a violation of a duty owing to operators in general and the injured operator
in particular.
CONCLUSION
The pleading rule enunciated in New York is far more restrictive than
the general rule elsewhere applied in negligence cases. The Campa decision
finds some justification in the fact that the machine which caused the injury
was one which was normally used only by adults without disabilities, and
that the duty of care based on reasonable foreseeability was fulfilled. Nevertheless, there are times "when an actor has reason to know that he is dealing
with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that they will
do unreasonable things."3 4 Thus, in Inman the duty of care might be far
different than it was in Campo. If a manufacturer knows his product is likely
to be brought into contact with infants or others under disability and reasonable steps may be taken to prevent injury then, in logic and justice, a duty
should arise in the manufacturer to take such steps. The extension of the
ordinary and generally accepted rule of negligence to manufacturer-remote
user cases would have the beneficial effect not only of preserving otherwise
reference to the possibility of safeguards. The District Court referred to this polibility but
pointed out, correctly, that nothing whatever was offered as a fact or as an issue of fact to
indicate the desirability or feasibility of additional accessories... .Plaintiff tendered no issue
of fact on this topic.... ." 247 F.2d at 32-33.
32. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wichman, 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1955). Cf. Karsteadt v.
Philip Gross Hardware & Supply Co., 179 Wis. 110, 190 N.N. 844 (1922). In the Allis

Chalmers case, supra, the court said: "[W]e conclude that the trial court cannot be said
to have erred in holding that a question of negligence was properly presented by the
evidence for the trier of the facts to determine

. . .

whether the defendant ...

ought

reasonably to have equipped the rollers with some shield or guard.. .." 220 F2d at
428-29.
33. Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013
(1959) (attempt to plead customary usage failed).
34. Prosser, Torts § 32, at 140 (2d ed. 1955).

